

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

| | | ACTION | INFO | DATE | INITIAL |
|----|----------|--------|------|------|---------|
| 1 | DCI | | | | |
| 2 | DDCI | | | | |
| 3 | EXDIR | | | | |
| 4 | D/ICS | | | | |
| 5 | DDI | | | | |
| 6 | DDA | | | | |
| 7 | DDO | | | | |
| 8 | DDS&T | | | | |
| 9 | Chm/NIC | | | | |
| 10 | GC | | | | |
| 11 | IG | | | | |
| 12 | Compt | | | | |
| 13 | D/OLL | | | | |
| 14 | D/PAO | | | | |
| 15 | D/PERS | | | | |
| 16 | VC/NIC | | | | |
| 17 | C/LA/DO | | X | | |
| 18 | D/ALA/DI | | X | | |
| 19 | NIO/LA | | X | | |
| 20 | D/OCR/DI | | X | | |
| 21 | | | | | |
| 22 | | | | | |

SUSPENSE *ER* Date _____

Remarks

Executive Secretary

6 Nov 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

8532812 thru 8532841

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



November 4, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL
(with SECRET attachments)

Executive Registry

85-4404

MEMORANDUM TO:

D - Mr. Whitehead
P - Mr. Armacost
E - Mr. Wallis
T - Mr. Schneider
M - Mr. Spiers
C - Mr. Derwinski
AF - Mr. Crocker
ARA - Mr. Abrams
EAP - Mr. Wolfowitz
EB - Mr. McMinn
EUR - Ms. Ridgway
H - Mr. Ball
HA - Mr. Schifter
INM - Mr. Thomas
INR - Mr. Abramowitz
IO - Mr. Keyes
L - Mr. Sofaer
NEA - Mr. Murphy
OES - Mr. Negroponte
PA - Mr. Kalb
PM - Mr. Holmes
RP - Mr. Purcell
S/CPR - Mrs. Roosevelt
S/CT - Mr. Oakley
S/NP - Mr. Kennedy
S/P - Mr. Rodman
CIA -
USIA - Mr. LaSalle
USOAS - Mr. McCormack
INR/B - Mr. Hirsch

SUBJECT: Requirements for the Secretary's Trip to
Cartagena, December 1-2, 1985

ARA COORDINATOR: Lowell R. Fleischer, USOAS, Room 6494,
632-9483

ARA DEPUTY COORDINATOR: Doug Hartley, USOAS, Room 6494, 632-9445

S/S-S ACTION OFFICER: Naim Ahmed, Room 7241, 632-8338
Alternate: Keith Eddins, Room 7241, 632-8338

This memorandum assigns responsibilities for the preparation of briefing materials for use by the Secretary during his trip to attend the OAS General Assembly in Cartagena, December 1-2, 1985.

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- 2 -

Bureaus wishing to suggest additions or changes to this tasker should contact the S/S-S Action Officer as soon as possible.

I. ACTION MEMORANDUM WITH RECOMMENDED SCHEDULE: ARA should prepare an action memorandum to the Secretary recommending a trip schedule. The memorandum should include a cable to post for the Secretary to approve, and is due in S/S-S by COB November 8.

II. ACTION MEMORANDUM WITH RECOMMENDED PARTICIPANTS: ARA should prepare an action memorandum to the Secretary with recommendations for participants (to be kept to a minimum) and notetakers in all events during the trip. This memorandum should also include a cable to post, and is due in S/S-S no later than COB November 14.

III. SCOPE PAPER: ARA should prepare a Scope Paper, in the form of a briefing outline from the Assistant Secretary (sample attached), focusing on the Secretary's meetings in Cartagena. The Scope Paper should, at a minimum, address the following questions: Where does our relationship with the OAS stand? What do we want to accomplish during the visit? What does the OAS want from us? What can we realistically hope to achieve? The scope paper, to be cleared by D, P and S/P at a minimum, should not exceed four pages and is due in S/S-S no later than COB November 18.

IV. BRIEFING OUTLINES FOR SCHEDULED MEETINGS: ARA should prepare briefing outlines for each one of the Secretary's meetings with foreign officials (sample attached). Briefing outlines should not exceed three pages, plus an attached page with setting and participants. All outlines should be cleared by P and other appropriate bureaus and are due in S/S-S by COB November 21.

As of November 4, the following meetings are anticipated: (additional briefing outlines should be prepared as meetings are scheduled)

| <u>Foreign Official</u> | <u>Draft</u> | <u>Clear</u> |
|-------------------------|--------------|---------------|
| President Betancur | ARA | P, INM, S/CT |
| Informal Dialogue | USOAS | P, E, INM, EB |
| Core Four/Contadora | ARA | P, S/S-E, PM |

V. SECRETARY'S SPEECH AT FIRST PLENARY: EB should draft the Secretary's speech to be given before the first plenary session of the OAS General Assembly. The focus of the speech should be the

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- 3 -

international debt situation with special reference to Latin America. The first draft of the speech, under cover of an info memo, (cleared by E, ARA, S/P and PA) is due in S/S-S by COB November 13.

VI. BRIEFING CARDS. ARA should prepare checklists on 5x8 cards for all of the Secretary's meetings (sample attached). The cards should present the main topics the Secretary should raise. They may also comment on the order of business, and note special sensitivities or courtesy points. All cards are due in S/S-S by COB November 21.

VII. FACT SHEETS: The following Fact Sheets should be prepared on State Department briefing paper (black top), and should not exceed one page in length (sample attached). Fact Sheets should be delivered to the ARA coordinator (fully cleared, including at least a DAS in the drafting bureau) by COB November 21.

| <u>Topic</u> | <u>Draft</u> | <u>Clear</u> |
|--------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| <u>OAS</u> | | |
| 1. Charter Reform Issues | USOAS | |
| 2. Human Rights Reports | HA | P, ARA |
| <u>REGIONAL ISSUES</u> | | |
| 1. Contadora/Central America | ARA | P |
| 2. Narcotics | INM | P, ARA |
| 3. Regional Economic Issues | ARA | P, E, EB |
| 4. Latin Debt | ARA | P, E, EB |
| <u>COLOMBIA</u> | | |
| 1. Political Situation | ARA | P |
| 2. Narcotics | INM | P, ARA |
| 3. Bilateral Commercial Issues | EB | E, ARA |

VIII. ECONOMIC DATA SHEETS: ARA should prepare Economic Data Sheets and "At A Glance" pages for Colombia. Similar sheets should also be prepared for the OAS if aggregate data is available. These papers (samples attached) should be cleared by E and EB and are due in S/S-S by COB November 22.

IX. SCENARIOS AND SCHEDULE: ARA should work closely with the Embassy to prepare scenarios for the Secretary. A scenario is

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- 4 -


needed for every public event, meeting, and movement in which the Secretary is involved. Final scenarios and the full schedule typed on plain bond are due to S/S-S no later than COB November 25.

X. SCHEDULE FOR MRS. SHULTZ: ARA should prepare a schedule for Mrs. Shultz for the trip, showing all the events in which she will participate. The schedule is due in S/S-S by COB November 13.

XI. PUBLIC STATEMENTS: ARA should prepare public remarks the Secretary may make during the trip, including contingency arrival and departure statements, toasts for all meal events and an opening statement for the press conference. All statements are due in S/S-S, cleared by P, PA and S/P, by COB November 25.

XII. BIOGRAPHIC MATERIAL: S/S-S will request appropriate biographic material. By COB November 13, ARA should provide the S/S-S Action Officer a list of names of all significant foreign officials the Secretary is likely to meet in Cartagena.

NOTE: S/S-S requires the original and one copy of all papers, with drafting and clearing information on a separate page. All papers must be delivered to the S/S-S Action Officer through the ARA Coordinator. Only the action and info memoranda should be logged in.


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments: List of Due Dates
Samples: Scope Paper
Briefing Outline
Briefing Card
Fact Sheet
Economic Data Sheets

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The Secretary's Trip to Cartagena
December 1-2, 1985

Due Dates

November 8

Action Memorandum with Recommended Schedule

November 13

Speech at First Plenary
Schedule for Mrs. Shultz
List of Biographic Material Needed

November 14

Action Memorandum with Recommended Participants

November 18

Scope Paper

November 21

Briefing Memoranda
Briefing Cards
Fact Sheets

November 22

Economic Data Sheets

November 25

Scenarios and Schedule
Public Statements



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

SECRET

SS

TO: The Secretary

FROM: NEA - Richard W. Murphy *RS for*

SUBJECT: Scope Paper for Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Peres, October 17 - 18

I. PERES AND U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP

- o Peres' commitment to peace process, willingness to negotiate territorial compromise, which contrasts sharply with Likud views, has created major change in relationship, important new opportunity for U.S. to deal with Arab-Israeli conflict.
- o Peres' success in disengaging, for most part, from Lebanon, rescuing Israeli economy from the brink, showed political leadership, skill.
- o These accomplishments bring Peres closer to point where he can address normalization with Egypt, negotiations with Jordan, and some quality of life issues, his major goals.
- o But Peres faces major challenges to reach these goals:
 - His Likud partners in the brittle national unity coalition oppose any territorial compromise, including return of Taba to Egypt; coalition agreement severely inhibits peace initiatives.
 - Growing terrorism, domestic extremism, weaken support for accommodation with Arabs.
 - Serious strain with Egypt over Tunis raid, killings in Sinai.

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-2-

- o Peres is at a point where he is most able to face a compelling peace issue, although if Likud obstructs, he may have to mobilize public support for elections, new Labor-led government.
 - Has urged us to avoid steps that he must oppose in context of coalition politics and current public opinion.
- o Other aspects of relationship are excellent
 - Unprecedented dialogue on economy through Joint Economic Development Group and U.S. support via supplementary aid for Peres' economic reform efforts, which are successful so far.
 - Military cooperation through JPMG going smoothly, rising levels of military aid support Israel's qualitative edge.
 - Free Trade Area Agreement is major new structural innovation in relationship.
 - GOI's willingness to establish VOA/RFE-RL relay station in Israel, cooperate on SDI research are other new elements of close, cooperative relations.
- o Problems in Relationship:
 - Israeli opposition to arms sales to Jordan, Saudi Arabia.
 - Possible future disproportionate and politically damaging retaliatory strikes against suspected terrorists in friendly Arab States.
 - Possible continuing, heavy demands for U.S. aid.
 - Repressive measures against Palestinians in occupied territories.
 - Continued involvement in south Lebanon, which could create new crisis there, although no other stable solution now.
 - Textile dispute.

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-3-

II. U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR PERES VISIT

- o Our basic goal is to:
 - Gain Peres' support for further steps in peace process in light of recent discussions with Hussein, seek Peres' views, test his political limits and, if possible get agreement on formula for Palestinian representation and international auspices.
 - Related goal is discussing Taba negotiations, ways to restore Israel-Egypt dialogue, following Tunis raid, U.S.-Egyptian reconciliation post Achille Lauro; avoid appearance of joint congratulation on Israeli strike on Tunis and U.S. diversion of Egyptian aircraft.
- o Subsidiary goals are to:
 - Ask Peres to avoid attacks on PLO in Jordan.
 - Probe Peres on renewed efforts to improve quality of Palestinian life as way of building confidence of Jordan and Palestinians in peace process and reducing tensions.
 - Discuss counter terrorism, U.S.-Israeli cooperation - but without formal agreement - and appropriate responses to terrorism that minimize damage to peace process; review Achille Lauro aftermath.
 - Review progress of GOI economic program, prospects for renewed growth and investment.
 - Seek Peres' understanding of our Jordan arms policy and urge restrained GOI response.

III. PERES' OBJECTIVES

- Peres' basic goals are to:
- Discuss how to move peace process forward in a way that fully takes account of his domestic political constraints; he has not given us his views in recent weeks, and his staff speculates that he may have some new ideas.
 - Use visit to demonstrate strength of U.S. Israeli relationship, his personal rapport with senior U.S. officials, and to thank us for our support for his government.

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-4-

- o Peres' subsidiary goals are to:
 - Request fuller U.S. understanding and support for Israeli counter-terrorist measures and seek more structured U.S.-Israeli anti-terrorism programs and cooperation, including, perhaps, an MOU.
 - Request East-West tour d'horizon and that we raise Soviet Jewry issue at Summit.
 - Ask for continued U.S. support for Israeli economic recovery and active support for growth and development, including possible financial backing of Israeli Exim Bank

IV. WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED FROM THIS VISIT?

- o Peace Process: closer understanding of strategy, possible agreement on approach compatible with Hussein's and ours.
- o Egyptian relations/Taba: no immediate resumption of dialogue, but useful discussion of next steps and U.S. role when post-Tunis emotions cool.
- o Quality of Life: rapid progress difficult now because of terrorism, negative political atmosphere in Israel; will discuss importance of this dimension of peace process and seek receptivity to structured approach, but there will probably be insufficient time for detailed discussions.
- o Terrorism: better Israeli understanding of U.S. concerns about need for proportionate, appropriate responses that do not jeopardize peace process; agreement of further liaison and cooperation, short of institutionalized or operational counter-terrorist cooperation and MOU that could complicate other U.S. interests in region.
- o Economy: serious discussion of Israeli economy and need for rigorous implementation of reform program; chance to focus on more practical, realistic, structural approach to growth, investment.

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-5-

- o Jordan arms: no agreement, Peres may suggest phased, linked approach; will seek to avoid embarrassing confrontation while here.
- o Israel actions against PLO in Jordan: we assume Peres will be understanding.
- o Atmospherics: very positive, projecting strong, confidential ties between Peres and Administration.

V. STRUCTURE OF MEETINGS

- o There will be two private meetings at your breakfast 7:30 - 9:00 Thursday and at 8:45 - 9:30 Friday before a larger meeting, 9:30 - 10:45; the private meetings should be devoted largely to peace process, Egypt and if time permits, quality of life issues; also requesting that the President devote fifteen minutes of his meeting with Peres at 2:00 Thursday to a tete-a-tete to discuss peace process.

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SAMPLE BRIEFING OUTLINE



SAMPLE

TMB

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

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TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Mr. Armacost

FROM: EUR - Richard Burt

SUBJECT: Meeting With NATO SYG Lord Carrington,
Thursday, April 4, 4:30-6:00 p.m.

I. EAST-WEST RELATIONS

- o Carrington supports emphasis on Western realism, strength, and dialogue in East-West relations.
- o Appreciative of being kept informed by President's and your periodic messages.
- o Soviets have not officially announced whether Gromyko will attend celebration of Thirtieth Anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty in Vienna on May 15.
- o Points to Make:
 - President committed to more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship. Must be based on reciprocity and Western strength.
 - Told Dobrynin last Saturday I would attend anniversary of Austrian State Treaty in Vienna. He said Gromyko's schedule not yet final.
 - Have left plans open to be able to meet Gromyko. Prefer meeting on May 14, since I will return to Washington immediately after celebration.
 - If Gromyko agrees, envisage full review of our relations, including Geneva talks.

II. GENEVA ARMS TALKS

- o Carrington helps maintain Allied solidarity behind U.S. arms-control positions. Cautions against hope for swift movement in Geneva.

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- 2 -

- o Believes our desire for Allied solidarity must be matched by willingness to consult closely on SDI, INF.
- o Some pressures in Alliance for new consultative arrangements, especially on defense/space.
- o Points to Make:
 - Appreciate your support for our positions at Geneva.
 - Principal goal is reduction of offensive nuclear weapons. Will also discuss SDI and a possible transition.
 - Will use existing consultative mechanisms intensively.

III. SDI

- o Focus of Washington agenda. Carrington supports SDI research, but is concerned SDI can easily become divisive political issue for Alliance.
- o Like Thatcher, believes deployment must be preceded by consultation and negotiation. Considers this crucial to keeping Allies supportive of U.S. program.
- o Feels that intensive consultations at NATO will continue to be necessary to educate and reassure Allies.
- o Believes public references by U.S. senior levels to immorality of nuclear weapons creates difficulties for Allied leaders, particularly in INF basing countries.
- o Points to Make:
 - Understand Allied concerns over strategic, political implications of SDI. Research is aimed at potential radical shift in strategy from what we have known for 40 years.
 - No new technology can alter our fundamental commitment to Western security.
 - SDI research will comply with ABM Treaty and take account of European defense needs.
 - Any decision to deploy would occur only after consultations with Allies and negotiations with Soviets.

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- 3 -

- Allied support for SDI research necessary to forestall unhelpful Soviet propaganda efforts at Geneva and elsewhere.
- In the meantime, we fully understand need not to undercut European public support of current reliance on nuclear deterrence.

IV. CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE

- o Last December, defense ministers mandated development of overall plan. Work somewhat behind schedule.
- o Report on overall approach and initial results due for DPC ministerial in May.
- o Carrington recognizes need to raise nuclear threshold and defuse Nunn pressures, but also conscious of resistance to raising defense budgets in Europe.
- o Point to Make:
 - Pleased you are leading Alliance toward improved conventional defense. Your assessment?

V. GREECE-TURKEY

- o Greece-NATO relations bad. Greeks will not participate in NATO exercises unless NATO acquiesces to Greece's view in Greece-Turkey dispute on Aegean.
- o Carrington concerned by situation. Had planned NATO effort to resolve problems. Initiative put off until after Greek elections at Allied request.
- o Points to Make:
 - NATO should examine Greek problem after presidential and parliamentary elections in Greece.
 - Support bilateral demarches by Allies pressing Athens to resume NATO exercises. Less sure about formal NATO demarches, but welcome your views.

VI. TERRORISM

- o Largely political consciousness-raising at NATO; modest increase in technical cooperation may result.
- o Point to Make:
 - Welcome your efforts to increase Allied cooperation against terrorism.

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- 4 -

SETTING

Your meeting will conclude Carrington's April 3-4 visit. He will have met with the President, Secretary Weinberger and had an intensive round of talks with Hill leaders.

Carrington's major purpose in his calls on you and the President will be to hear our views on relations with the new Soviet leadership, and our plans for Geneva and SDI. His chief purpose on the Hill will be to stress that the Allies are essential to U.S. security and contributing fairly to the common defense.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
Michael Armacost
Ambassador Abshire
Paul Nitze
Richard Burt
John Hawes, Acting Director of PM
Charles Redman (notetaker), EUR/RPM

NATO

SYG Carrington
Brian Fall, Chef de Cabinet
Marc Grossman,
Deputy Chef de Cabinet

Attachments

- Tab A - Carrington's Washington Schedule
- Tab B - Biographic information on Carrington

Drafted: EUR/RPM/P: JHamilton *JH*
3/28/85 632-3198 (1540B)
Cleared: EUR: RHaass
EUR: JFDobbins
EUR/RPM: CRedman
S/ARN: SPifer
PM: JHawes
M/CT: EBailey
EUR/SE: DJones
EUR/SOV: LPascoe

JH

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SAMPLE BRIEFING CARD

SAMPLE

MEETING WITH NATO SYG PETER CARRINGTON

Manacement of Ministerial

- Know you share goal of projecting Allied unity, especially in wake of well-publicized SDI differences.

East-West Relations

- President committed to more constructive relationship with Soviets based on reciprocity and Western strength.
- Meeting showed we cannot improve East-West relations without Soviet cooperation.

Geneva Arms Talks

- Communique should support U.S. at beginning of second round.
- Principal goal remains reduction of offensive nuclear weapons. Will continue to discuss SDI and a transition.
- Will use existing consultative mechanisms intensively.

SDI

- Research will comply with ABM Treaty and take account of European defense needs. Will not undercut nuclear deterrent. Consultation, negotiation before deployment.
- Allied support for and participation in SDI research politically important.

Conventional Defense

- Pleased you are leading Alliance to improve conventional defenses. Need to keep up momentum.

Terrorism

- Welcome your efforts to improve Allied cooperation against terrorism.

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SAMPLE**FACT SHEET: HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT****I. HUSSEIN-ARAFAT DIALOGUE**

- o At Nov. PNC in Amman, Hussein openly challenged the PLO to accept UNSC Res. 242 & abandon call for independent Palestinian state.
- o Hussein needs Palestinian support for direct negotiations with Israel on West Bank & Gaza.
- o The Jordan-PLO dialogue produced a document, agreed to in mid-Feb.; different texts & interpretations exist, but basic points are:
 - "land for peace formula," but no explicit acceptance of UNSC 242
 - Palestinian self-determination w/i confederation with Jordan, including two states of Jordan & Palestine
 - Solving Palestinian refugee problem per UN resolutions
 - Solving all aspects of Palestine question
 - International conference with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation

II. REGIONAL REACTION

- o Mubarak has termed Hussein/Arafat agree't a step forward and suggested a U.S.-hosted preparatory talks betwn Israel & Jordan-Palestinian delegation.
- o Peres has reacted skeptically, but welcomed Mubarak call for direct talks between Israel & Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (no PLO).

III. U.S. POSITION

- o U.S. ready to support direct talks; remains opposed to international conference.
- o U.S. termed Hussein/Arafat agree't positive if it facilitates Jordanian entry into negotiations.
- o U.S. supports Palestinian participation at every stage of peace process; remains committed to Sept. 1 initiative.
- o U.S. will not recognize or negotiate with PLO until PLO:
 - recognizes Israel's right to exist, and
 - recognizes UNSC Res. 242 & 338

IV. KEY QUESTION

- o Are Jordan and Palestinians ready to enter into direct negotiations with Israel on basis of UNSC Res. 242?

FACT SHEET

- purpose: to provide factual background information in a concise format.
- format: one page, using headings in logical progression, with bullets for main points and ticks for subsidiary points under each heading. Should provide principal a concise overview of the issue discussed, including where it stands and what we should do about it. Incomplete, telegraphic sentences preferred.
- uses: mostly briefing books. Fact sheets are a condensed version of the background papers earlier provided for trips, visits, testimony and to the White House. Topics covered range from the general, e.g. "US-British Relations" to the very specific, e.g. "Israeli Cabinet Formation".

ECUADOR -- AT A GLANCE

- o Growth weak but inflation down.
 - Real growth this year may not match 1984's 3 percent.
 - Agriculture rebounding from "El Nino"; oil production up.
 - Inflation this year will be about half the 1983 peak of 53 percent.
- o Good compliance with IMF program; seeking multi-year reschedulings.
 - Met all but one target of 1983/84 stand-by; new stand-by approved March 11.
 - Agreement in principle on \$4.6 billion com'l bank multi-year rescheduling.
 - Paris Club may approve Multi-Year Rescheduling Agreement in April.
 - Ecuadoreans taking pragmatic approach to external debt issues.
- o President Febres-Cordero favors private sector, free market policies.
 - Signed OPIC Investment Guarantee Agreement last November.
 - Encouraging oil exploration by foreign companies.
 - Eliminated budget deficit, cutting subsidies, more flexible exchange rate.

Wang 4375P

SAMPLE

ECONOMIC DATA CHART -- ECUADOR

Revised: 1/25/85

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| | <u>1981</u> | <u>1982</u> | <u>1983</u> | <u>1984 E</u> | <u>1985 E</u> |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| 1. ECONOMIC INDICATORS: | | | | | |
| 1a. Population (mid-year, million) | 8.6 | 9.0 | 9.3 | 9.5 | 9.7 |
| 1b. Official Unemployment Rate (percent) | 10.0 | 8.7 | 12 | 8 | 7 |
| 1c. Gross Domestic Product (\$ billion) (1) | 13.9 | 13.8 | 12.9 | 10.4 | 11.2 |
| 1d. GDP Per Capita (\$) | 1600 | 1550 | 1450 | 1200 | 1150 |
| 1e. Investment/GDP Ratio (percent) | 24.6 | 24.6 | 16.4 | N/A | N/A |
| 1f. Real GDP (percent change) | 4.3 | 1.4 | -3.3 | 3.0 | 2.4 |
| 1g. Real GDP Per Capita (percent change) | 1.6 | -1.3 | -6.2 | 0.1 | -0.5 |
| 1h. Inflation Rate (percent) | 17.3 | 24.4 | 52.5 | 25.1 | 20 |
| 2. FISCAL INDICATORS: | | | | | |
| 2a. Public Sector Revenues as percent of GDP | 13.4 | 10.7 | 27.0 | 29.2 | 31.4 |
| 2b. Public Sector Expenditures as pct of GDP | 19.0 | 17.5 | 27.1 | 29.2 | 30.0 |
| 2c. Public Sector Balance as percent of GDP | -5.6 | -6.8 | -0.1 | -- | 3.4 |
| 3. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: | | | | | |
| 3a. Exports to US (\$ billion) | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| 3b. Imports from US (\$ billion) | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 |
| 3c. Total Exports (\$ billion) | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.7 |
| 3d. Total Imports (\$ billion) | 2.4 | 2.2 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.8 |
| 3e. Merchandise Trade Balance (\$ billion) | 0.1 | 0.1 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| 3f. Current Account Balance (\$ billion) | -1.0 | -1.2 | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.2 |
| 4. EXTERNAL DEBT | | | | | |
| 4a. Gross External Debt (\$ billion) | 5.9 | 6.2 | 6.9 | 7.2 | 7.5 |
| 4b. Gross External Debt per capita (\$) | 680 | 690 | 740 | 760 | 770 |
| 4c. Debt Service Paid (\$ billion) | 1.8 | 2.1 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 1.1 |
| 4d. Debt Service as percent of exports | 71 | 77 | 34 | 36 | 37 |
| 4e. Gross Debt as percent of GDP | 54 | 45 | 53 | 58 | N/A |
| 5. US BILATERAL AID, by Fiscal Year | | | | | |
| 5a. Economic assistance (\$ million) (2) | 14.8 | 19.7 | 11.1 | 12.2 | 11.7 |
| 5b. Military assistance (\$ million) | 4.3 | 5.8 | 4.6 | 6.7 | 6.3 |

(1) GDP data are derived and subject to distortion because of exchange rate fluctuations.
 (2) Excludes FY 83/84 Disaster Assistance of \$23 million.